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ABSTRACT: We present a three-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector, which 
produces an intermediary for the formal sector, and analyze the effects of different policies on the 
environmental standard and welfare of the economy. Since the informal manufacturing sector creates 
pollution, higher the use of informal sector product, higher is the pollution created and higher the 
discrepancy between actual and permissible levels of pollution, so that the emission tax payable by the 
formal sector is also higher. The efficiency of a representative worker is inversely related to the level of 
pollution. In this setup, we show that even if the permissible level of pollution is reduced, the polluting 
sector may expand and worsen the environmental standard. However, this policy may be welfare 
improving. On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital may reduce the pollution level but affect welfare 
adversely. The paper finds that there might exist a trade-off between the economy’s twin objectives of 
lowering the level of pollution and improving national welfare. These results are new in the trade and 
environment literature.  
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POLLUTION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF INFORMAL SECTOR: IS THERE ANY 
TRADE-OFF? 
 
1.   Introduction 
  
In recent years pollution control is considered as one of the most important among all the policy measures 
facing the policy makers of the developing countries. Pollution is perhaps an unavoidable accomplice of 
economic growth and development. Development fosters higher consumption demand, larger population 
size (due to a lower death rate) and a high standard of living, generating more discharges to the 
environment in the form of smoke, scraps, wastes and garbage causing greater pollution. At the same time, 
people of a developed nation usually demand higher standards of living atmosphere. As the absorbing 
capacity of nature is already saturated, pollution cannot be allowed to increase infinitely since it poses a 
serious threat on the entire living world. Thus a possible solution to this problem is a trade-off between 
pollution level and economic growth.  
 
Most countries have taken significant movements to protect environment, and the developed ones have 
successfully been able to combat pollution to a large extent. But for the developing countries, a major 
problem in regulating environmental standards is the persistence of an informal sector.
1
 The  informal 
sector constitutes a large part of the manufacturing and service sectors. On the basis of the works of Agenor 
(1996), Cole and Sanders (1985), Majumdar (1993), we find that informal sectors provide most of the 
employment in most of the developing countries. Empirical evidence (see for example, Papola (1981), 
Romatet (1983), Joshi and Joshi (1976)) also suggests that the urban informal sector units mostly produce 
intermediate inputs for the formal manufacturing sector on a subcontracting basis. It also suggests that this 
sector is a major source of environmental pollution. For example, in the city of Kolkata, India leather 
tanning process is handled by the informal sector. Similarly, for the garments industry the dyeing of 
garments are done by the informal sector participants on a subcontracting basis. Both tanning and dyeing 
pollute the environment considerably. Thus, it can be argued that one major reason behind the 
environmental degradation in the developing countries with expansion of economic activity is the wide 
prevalence of the urban informal sector. Usually, legislative authorities adopt two major types of 
environmental regulation, namely, command and control and economic incentives. In case of command and 
control, the regulator specifies the steps to control pollution after collecting the necessary information 
regarding the polluter. Economic incentives can take the form of pollution fees, marketable permits and 
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 Enterprises, which are unregistered and engaged in manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, service 
sectors etc. constitute the informal sector. Unlike the formal sector firms the informal sector units do not 





2  Although these methods can be implemented for the formal sectors in developed countries, the 
unregistered informal manufacturing units cannot be forced or induced to internalize the environmental 
costs inflicted on the society due to two reasons. First, these units are unregistered, geographically 
dispersed and it is quite difficult to identify them. Hence they cannot be kept under the surveillance of the 
regulating authority. Secondly, the informal sector units with a nominal capital base cannot afford to pay 
pollution fees or install pollution abating equipments. However, the significant amount of pollution created 
by them cannot be left unattended. 
 
Biller and Quintero (1995) have examined leather tanneries in Bogota, Colombia. In addition to tanneries 
they identify the metalworking, electroplating, and textile industries, automobile repair shops, and brick 
manufacturing as typical informal sector activities causing severe contamination. Blackman and Bannister 
(1996) have presented the results of an econometric analysis of the diffusion of propane among informal 
'traditional' brick-makers in Cd. Juárez, Mexico and suggested that community pressure applied by private-
sector trade and neighborhood organizations can generate strong incentives for informal firms to adopt 
clean technologies. Blackman (1999) has developed a list of feasible environmental management policies. 
 
Among the many alternatives, one of the possible solutions may be to target the formal sector with the 
capability of bearing the external costs. Most of the informal sector products are used as intermediate goods 
by the formal sector (for example, in shoe industry, garment industry, etc.). This is particularly beneficial 
for the formal sector since labor is cheap in the informal sector and due to absence of labor legislation laws, 
labor can be fully exploited. Now, if the formal sector is made to pay for its use of the output of the 
polluting informal sector, it may work as an indirect incentive to reduce informal sector production, 
generating less pollution.  
 
The central objectives of the present paper are as follows. We consider a three-sector general equilibrium 
model with an informal sector, the output of which is used as an intermediary in the formal sector. We have 
assumed that environmental pollution occurs through the production of goods of the informal sector. The 
formal sector firms are made to pay a pollution emission tax if the actual level of pollution exceeds a 
certain permissible limit, decided by the pollution regulatory authority. The tax revenue collected from this 
source is transferred to the workers as they are the victims of environmental pollution. Labour endowment 
is measured in efficiency units where the efficiency of a representative worker is inversely related to the 
level of pollution. So, any change in the actual level of pollution affects the efficiency of the workers and 
hence affects the effective labour endowment. This again causes a change in the inter-sectoral output and 
the level of pollution. Higher the use of informal sector product, higher is the pollution created and higher 
the discrepancy between actual and permissible levels of pollution, so that the emission taxes payable by 
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 See Kolstad (2000) for more details.  
 
4 
the formal sector is also higher. In this situation, we show that even if the permissible pollution level is 
reduced, the polluting sector may expand and produce perverse effect on the actual environmental pollution 
level of the economy. However, this policy is likely to influence national welfare favourably. Next, we 
have analyzed the effects of indirect policies like an inflow of foreign capital on the level of pollution and 
welfare of the economy. We have found that an inflow of foreign capital
3
 although may lower the level of 
pollution affect welfare adversely. According to the conventional wisdom an inflow of foreign capital is 
likely to increase the level of pollution by increasing the size of the formal and informal sectors but leaves 
welfare unaffected in the absence of any tariff-protection of the import-competing sector. Quite 
interestingly, we have found that an inflow of foreign capital may reduce the pollution level but lead to 
welfare deterioration even in the absence of any protectionist policy. On the other hand, a direct policy e.g. 
a reduction in the permissible level of pollution designed to mitigate pollution, contrary to the common 
belief, may become counterproductive in the given setup. Thus, in both cases the paper finds that there 
might exist a trade-off between the economy’s objectives of improving the environmental standard and 
improving national welfare. These results are new in the literature on trade and environment.  
 
2.   The Model 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors operating at close vicinity. Sector 1 (rural sector) 
produces an agricultural (export) commodity using capital and labour. There are two manufacturing 
sectors: formal (sector 3) and informal (sector 2). The informal manufacturing sector produces a non-traded 
intermediary for the formal sector using capital and labor. The formal sector is the tariff-protected import-
competing sector producing a manufacturing commodity using capital, labor and the non-traded 
intermediary produced by the informal sector. Capital is mobile among the three sectors. On the other hand, 
labour is perfectly mobile between the agricultural and informal manufacturing sectors. But the formal 
sector faces an imperfect labour market. It is assumed that labor in the formal sector earns a contractual 
wage, * W , while the wage rate in the informal sector, W , is market determined and  . * W W >  Owing to 
our small open economy assumption, we consider that the final commodity prices are given internationally. 
The price of the non-traded intermediary produced by sector 2 is determined endogenously. Production 
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 An inflow of foreign capital is sometimes accompanied by technology transfer including Environmentally 
Sound Technology (EST). As a result of foreign direct investment, residents of the host country come into 
contact with foreign entrepreneurs who possess superior technical skills and know how. These new ideas 
lead to transfer of technology from the foreigners to the residents of the host country and it takes place 
through observation discussion and training. This transmission can be considered as a spillover or external 
effect on the host country. So technology transfer in developing countries takes place mainly through 
foreign direct investment. However, we here do not consider the case of technology transfer. There is a 
separate and well-enriched literature in this area. See for example, Mansfield (1961, 1968), Koizumi and 





functions exhibit constant returns to scale
4
 with diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. The three 
inputs, capital, labor and the non-traded intermediary, are fully employed. The aggregate capital stock of 
the economy consists of both domestic and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes. Income from 
foreign capital is completely repatriated. Finally, commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
 
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
Ki a = capital-output ratio in the ith sector, ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i  
Li a = labour-output ratio in the ith sector, ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i  
23 a = amount of intermediary required to produce 1 unit of commodity 3 (technologically fixed); 
= 1 P 1 (commodity 1 is the numeraire); 
3 P  =  world price of good 3; 
2 P = endogenously determined price of the non-traded input; 
m = ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 3; 
= + = ) 1 ( 3
*
3 m P P  tariff-inclusive or domestic price of commodity 3; 
h = efficiency of each worker; 
W = competitive wage rate (in efficiency unit);   
* W = unionized wage in the formal sector (in efficiency unit); 
r = return to capital; 
i X = output level of thei th sector,  ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i  
L = labour endowment of the economy in physical unit (normalized to unity); 
D K = domestic capital stock of the economy; 
K = aggregate capital stock of the economy including foreign capital; 
Z = actual level of pollution in the economy; 
Z = permissible level of pollution; 
(.) T = aggregate pollution emission tax; 
ji θ = distributive share of the j th input in thei th sector,  ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i ; 
ji λ = proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector,  ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i ; 
                                                 
4
 Production in the import-competing sector, apart from capital and labour inputs, requires a non-traded 
intermediary, per-unit requirement of which is assumed to be technologically fixed. However, labour and 
capital are substitutes and the production function displays the property of constant returns to scale in these 
two inputs.  
 
6 
= i σ elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in thei th sector, ; 3 . 2 , 1 = i   
Y = national income at world prices; 
∧= percentage change.  
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the set of following equations: 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality conditions relating 
to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three equations, respectively. 
1 1 1 = + K L ra Wa                                                                                                       (1) 
2 2 2 P ra Wa K L = +                                                                                                                                (2) 
3
2
3 23 2 3 3
* ) ) ( (
) 1 (
X
Z X Z T
m P a P ra a W K L
−
− + = + +                                                               (3) 
 
The rural sector does not generate any pollution
5
 and without any loss of generality it is assumed that the 
informal sector is the only polluting sector
6
 so that pollution level (industrial emission),Z , is a positive 
function of the production level of the informal sector, 
2 X , i.e. 
) ( 2 X Z Z = ;Z′ . 0 >                                                                        
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we assume that  (.) Z is strictly proportional to 2 X . So, we write 
0 , 0 ; 2 = ′ ′ > ′ ′ = Z Z X Z Z                                                                                                                      (4) 
In other words, Z′is a constant. 
 
Even though the informal sector is the only polluting sector, it cannot be brought directly under government 
regulation simply because these are unregistered units. Hence it is only the formal sector, which can be 
compelled to maintain the environmental standards by making them pay emission tax for the pollution 
created by them indirectly by the usage of the intermediary produced by the polluting informal sector. 
                                                 
5
 This is only a simplifying assumption. A typical rural sector is assumed to produce a primary exportable 
commodity. Production of primary exportable commodities also vitiates the environment through use of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. However, the amount of pollution generated by the rural sector is 
insignificant relative to that produced by the manufacturing sectors. 
 
6
 Qualitative results of the model remain unchanged even if the formal sector is also assumed to produce 
pollution. As formal manufacturing sector uses an intermediary produced by the informal sector at a fixed 
proportion, an expansion of the formal sector implies an expansion of the informal sector. Thus, the 
qualitative effect of any policy on the informal sector’s output (and hence pollution) is equivalent to the 




Now, let Z be the permissible level of pollution, which is a policy parameter of the government. Greater 
the discrepancy between the permissible level, Z , and the actual level of pollution, Z , more is the 
deterioration in environmental standards and hence higher the aggregate pollution emission tax, T , borne 
by the formal sector.  
 
We define the emission tax function as follows. 
 
             0   for  2 2 X X ≤ ; and, 
= T                                                                                                                                                             (5) 
              0 ); ) ( ( 2 > ′ − T Z X Z T  for 2 2 X X > .   
 
We explain this emission tax function as follows. We have already stated that the informal sector is the 
only polluting sector, the level of pollution increases with an increase in the level of production of this 
sector and that there is a permissible level of pollution, denoted Z . Let 2 X be the level of production at 
which  . (.) Z Z = So, for any 2 2 X X ≤ , the level of pollution in the economy does not exceed the 
permissible limit and the emission tax borne by the formal sector is zero. But, once  2 X surpasses 2 X , the 
pollution level goes above the permissible limit and the emission tax on the formal sector becomes positive. 
The amount of tax increases as the difference between 2 X and  2 X (and hence between  (.) Z and Z ) 
increases. As our policy analysis is meaningful only when  , (.) Z Z > we concentrate solely on the case 
where . 2 2 X X >       
 
The entire emission tax revenue is transferred to the workers in a lump-sum fashion.  The right-hand side of 
equation (3) denotes the unit domestic price of  3 X  net of emission tax where 
3
2 ) ) ( (
X
Z X Z T −
 is the 
effective emission tax per unit of output that the formal sector has to bear. 
 
 
Complete utilization of capital in the economy implies that 
K X a X a X a K K K = + + 3 3 2 2 1 1                                                                                                      (6) 




The output of the informal sector, 2 X , is used entirely for producing  3 X , so that the supply of  2 X is 
circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand – supply equality condition is given by 
3 23 2 2 X a X X
D = =                                                                                                                                    (7) 
Here,  23 a  is assumed to be a constant. This means that to produce one unit of the formal sector’s product 




It is assumed that the efficiency of a representative worker, h , is inversely related to the level of 
pollution,Z , in the economy. Environmental pollution leads to health hazards
8
, thus adversely affecting 
the worker’s efficiency. Although in this model the informal sector only creates pollution, it is assumed that 
pollution affects the efficiency of the entire workforce, not only those who are engaged in the informal 
sector activities. This is because the three sectors operate at close vicinity so that environmental 
degradation affects all the members of the working class equally. Thus, 
= h )) ( ( 2 X Z h ;h′ 0 < .                                                                                                                    (8) 
 
After normalizing the labor endowment in physical units to unity, the full-employment of labor in 
efficiency units implies the following:  
)) ( ( 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 X Z h X a X a X a L L L = + +                                                                                          (9) 
where  i LiX a is the employment of labor in the ith
 sector in efficiency units for i = 1, 2 and 3. As the labor 
endowment of the economy in physical units has been normalized to unity, the labor endowment in 
efficiency units is )) ( ( 2 X Z h . 
 
Throughout the paper, we shall make the following assumptions regarding the relative factor intensities of 
the different sectors of the economy. The agricultural sector is always more labour intensive than the 
                                                 
7
  It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded intermediary and other factors of 
production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. In industries 
like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their production to the small informal 
sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the production is done in the informal sector firms 
while labeling, packaging and marketing are done by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in 
the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final 
commodity. Thus there might exist a fixed proportion between the use of the intermediary and the quantity 
of the final commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. It may be noted that Gupta (1994), 
Chaudhuri (2003) and Marjit (2003) have also made this assumption in different contexts.  
 
8
  Air pollution can lead to irritation, breathing problems and lung diseases; water pollution causes 
contaminated drinking water; improper waste disposal management involves significant human pathogens 




formal manufacturing sector and that the industrial sector as a whole (formal plus informal) is more capital 
intensive than the agricultural sector in value terms.
9
 The latter implies that the industrial sector is also 
more capital intensive vis-à-vis the agricultural sector in physical terms as well. In mathematical terms, we 
write the capital intensity conditions as follows.  
 
0 ) ( 1 3 3 1 > − K L K L λ λ λ λ ; 
 
; 0 )} ( ) ( { 2 23 3 1 2 23 3 1 > + − + L L K K K L θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ and,                                                                        (10) 
                                                                                                                                                          
. 0 )} ( ) ( { 2 23 3 1 2 23 3 1 > + − + L L K K K L λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ                                                                         
 
From (10) the following relationships trivially follow. 
 
; 0 )} ( { 2 1 23 1 3 > − + L L L K θ θ θ θ θ and, 
                                                                                                                                                                (10.1)          
0 )}] ( (.))} / (.) ( { [ 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 < + − ′ ′ − + K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ  
 
However, the informal manufacturing sector can independently be either capital intensive or labour 
intensive relative to the agricultural sector. In the main body of the paper, we concentrate on the case where 
the agricultural sector is more labor intensive than the informal manufacturing sector.
10
 In terms of algebra, 
this can be expressed as follows. 
) ( 1 2 2 1 K L K L θ θ θ θ > i.e. ) ( 2 1 L L θ θ > ; and,  ) ( 1 2 2 1 K L K L λ λ λ λ >                                                      (11)   
 
 
There are nine endogenous variables in the system:  Z h X X X P r W , , , , , , , 3 2 1 2 and T . This is an 
indecomposable production system where any changes in factor endowment affect factor prices and factor 
coefficients. By solving equations (1) and (2) W  and r can be obtained in terms of 2 P . Substituting the 
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 This assumption is quite realistic and has been extensively used in the theoretical literature on trade and 
development. See Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1997) and Chaudhuri (2003) in this context. 
 
10
 The case where the informal manufacturing sector is more labor intensive vis-à-vis the agricultural 
sector has been taken up in Appendix V. In that case, some of the results of the model hold under different 
sufficient conditions. Instead of dealing with both the cases, we consider only one case in details, since our 
main intention is to question the desirability of policies rendering a lower permissible level of pollution. If 




values of W  and r  into (3), solving simultaneously with (6) and (9) and using (7), the values of  2 1, X X  
and  2 P  can be obtained.
11
 Having obtained  2 X , one can find 3 X from (7). Again,Z  can be obtained 
from (4) and h  from (8) once  2 X  is obtained. Having obtainedZ , from equation (5)T can be found. 
 
Before turning to analyze the policy effects, we should mention that our measure of welfare in this small 
open economy is national income at world prices,Y , which is expressed as follows
12
: 
D L L L rK X a W X a X a W Y + + + = 3 3
*
2 2 1 1 ) ( 3 3 2 ) ) ( ( X mP Z X Z T − − +    
Using equation (9) the above expression becomes 
Y D L rK X a W W Wh + − + = 3 3
* ) ( (.) 3 3 2 ) ) ( ( X mP Z X Z T − − +                                               (12) 
 
In equation (12),  ) ( 2 2 1 1 X a X a W L L +  is the total wage income of the workers engaged in the first two 
sectors of the economy.  3 3
* X a W L  is the amount of the wage income of the laborers employed in the 
formal sector.  D rK is the rental income from domestic capital.
13
  ) ) ( ( 2 Z X Z T − is the revenue from the 
emission tax, which the workers receive as transfer payments. Finally,  3 3X mP measures the cost of tariff 
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 We should note that  2 X is nothing but the supply of commodity 2 i.e.
S X 2 . Conversely,  3 23X a in 
equation (7) gives the demand for the non-traded intermediary i.e. 
D X 2 . Usually, 
D X 2 and
S X 2 would not 
match if one starts from a random  2 P . Therefore, we can define an excess demand function for commodity 
2 as:  ). ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 P X P X P E
S D − = Equation (7) is valid if and only if  0 ) ( 2 = P E say at  . 2 2
e P P = For 
making the entire system consistent, we assume that such a  0 2 >
e P exists and it is unique. See, Marjit 
(2003) in this context.  
 
12
 One may argue that the national welfare function does not explicitly contain any social cost due to 
pollution. However, the welfare function indirectly takes care of the cost due to pollution. This is because it 
contains the labour endowment in efficiency units, which is negatively related to the level of pollution. So 
as pollution level rises the endowment of labour in efficiency unit falls leading to a decrease in aggregate 
wage income. However, qualitative results of the paper hold under different sufficient conditions even if we 
consider welfare as: * Y D L rK X a W W Wh + − + = 3 3
* ) ( (.) ) ) ( ( 2 Z X Z T − + −  ) ( 2 X Z β , where 
β  is the marginal social cost due to pollution. 
 
13
 Income from foreign capital is fully repatriated. Hence, it is not included in equation (12).  
 
11 
3.   Comparative static exercises 
   
According to the conventional wisdom, any policy that entails an improvement in environmental standards 
is welfare enhancing. Thus, a lowering of the permissible level of pollution by the pollution controlling 
authority appears to be a highly desirable policy. But, in this paper, we reanalyze the efficacy of such direct 
environmental policy in lowering pollution level and improving welfare in a developing country in the 
presence of an informal manufacturing sector generating considerable amount of pollution. We then 
examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital
14
 on the level of environmental pollution as well as on 
welfare of the economy in the given setup.  
 




1 1 = + r W K L θ θ                                                                                                                                   (13) 
2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ P r W K L = +θ θ                                                                                                                                (14) 
  
Solving (13) and (14) by Cramer’s rule, one gets the following expressions: 
θ θ / ) ˆ ( ˆ
2 1P W K − =                                                                                                                                (15) 
θ θ / ˆ ˆ 2 1P r L = ; and,                                                                                                                               (16) 
) / ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( 2 θ P r W − = −                                                                                                                             (17) 
where, 
2 1 2 1 L K K L θ θ θ θ θ − = = 2 1 L L θ θ − .   
 
Now, differentiation of (7), gives 
2 3 ˆ ˆ X X =                                                                                                                                                 (18) 
Total differentiation of equations (3), (9) and (6) and use of (15) – (17) and (18) yield
16
 the following 
expressions, respectively. 
                                                 
14
 See footnote 3 in this context. 
 
15
 Producers in each industry choose techniques of production so as to minimize unit costs. This leads to 
the condition that the distributive-share weighted averages of changes in input-output coefficients along the 
unit isoquant in each industry must vanish near the cost-minimization point. This states that an isocost line 
is tangent to the unit isoquant. In mathematical terms, cost-minimization conditions for the three industries 
may be written as:  0 ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 1 = + K K L L a a θ θ ;  0 ˆ ˆ 2 2 2 2 = + K K L L a a θ θ ; and,  0 ˆ ˆ 3 3 3 3 = + K K L L a a θ θ .  




2 2 2 2 23 2 1 23 1 3 2 ˆ (.)} (.) ){ / ( )] ( )[ / ˆ ( X T X Z T X P P L L L K − ′ ′ + − + θ θ θ θ θ θ θ      
                                                                   ) ˆ (.) )( / ( 2 2 23 Z Z T X P ′ = θ       ( 1 9 )                                      
))] 1 /( ( )[ / ˆ ( 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ θ − + + L K L K L K L P  
                                                               1 1 2 2 3 2 ˆ ˆ (.))} / (.) ( { X X h X Z h L L L λ λ λ + ′ ′ − + + = 0              (20) 
and, 
))] 1 /( ( )[ / ˆ ( 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ θ − − − − L L K L K L K P    
                                                                          1 1 2 3 2 ˆ ˆ ) ( X X K K K λ λ λ + + + K ˆ =                     (21)                                      
 
Solving equations (19) − (21) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions can be obtained. 
K X L L L L K ˆ )] ( )[ / 1 ( ˆ
1 2 1 23 1 3 2 λ θ θ θ θ θ θ − + ∆ − =  
                                              (+) 
            − ) ( )}[ /( ) (.) {( ˆ
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 23 L K L K L K L K X P Z T Z θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ θ θ + + ∆ ′         
                                                                    + )] ))( 1 /( ( 3 3 1 3 3 1 23 3 1 L K L K L K L θ λ λ θ λ λ θ σ θ + −               (22)                                      
                                                                                              (+)                 
and, 
)} /( ) (.) [{( ˆ ˆ
2 2 23 2 X P Z T Z P ∆ ′ = θ )}] ( (.))) / (.) ( ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +  
                                                                                                                              (−) 
                                                 )] /( (.)} (.) ){ [( ˆ
2 2 2 23 1 X P T X Z T K L ∆ − ′ ′ + θ λ                                    (23)                                        
where, 
)[ / 1 ( θ = ∆ { ) ( 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − + } )}] ( (.)) / (.) ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +       
                                      (+)                                                                                           (−)  
                 − )] /( (.)} (.) { [ 2 2 2 23 θ θ X P T X Z T − ′ ′ ) ( [ 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ + +  
                                                                         )] ))( 1 /( ( 3 3 1 3 3 1 23 3 1 L K L K L K L θ λ λ θ λ λ θ σ θ + − +         (24) 
                                                                                                    (+) 
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As commodity 2 is a non-traded intermediary, its market must clear domestically and the comparative static 
exercises are meaningful only if the equilibrium in the market for commodity 2 is stable. It can be checked 




. 0 ) / ( ) / ( > ∆′ = ∆ λ θ λ                                                                                                                     (25) 
where:  ) ( 2 1 2 1 L K K L θ θ θ θ θ − = ; 
) ( [{ 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − + = ∆′ } )}] ( (.)) / (.) ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +       
                          (+)                                                                                            (−)  
            − )] /( (.)} (.) { [ 2 2 2 23 X P T X Z T − ′ ′ θ ) ( [ 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ + +  
                                                                  )] ))( 1 /( ( 3 3 1 3 3 1 23 3 1 L K L K L K L θ λ λ θ λ λ θ σ θ + − +            (26.1) 
                                                                                                    (+) 
(.))}] / (.) ( { ) ( [ 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 h X Z h H G L K K L K L K L ′ ′ − − + − = λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ ;                              (26.2) 
; 0 ) / (.) ( 3
*
3 2 > ′ ′ = X P X Z T G and,                                                                                                    (26.3) 
. 0 ) / (.) ( 3
*
3 > = X P T H                                                                                                                       (26.4) 
 
In the present case where the agricultural sector is more labour intensive vis-à-vis the informal 
manufacturing sector,
18
 we have  . 0 > θ Using (26.3) and (26.4) from (26.2) we obtain that  . 0 > λ  Then 
using (10.1), from (25) and (26.1) we find that for the fulfillment of the stability condition in the market for 
the non-traded intermediary one requires  0 > ∆ and  . 0 > ∆′ The necessary condition for . 0 > ∆′ is: 
(.)}. (.) { 2 T X Z T < ′ ′   This, in turn, implies that  ) / 1 ( Z Z ET − < where 
(.)}]) / ) )}{( ( / (.) [{ ( T Z Z Z Z d dT ET − − = is the elasticity of the emission tax function.  
     
                                                 
17
 This has been derived in Appendix II. 
 
18
 See footnote 11 in this context.  
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3.1   Policy effects on environmental pollution 
 
In the stable equilibrium in the market for the non-traded intermediary we have found that  . 0 > ∆ From 
(22), it now follows that 2 ˆ X 0 > when  0 ˆ < Z ; and,  2 ˆ X < 0  when K ˆ 0 > . Differentiating equation (4) 
one gets 
2 2 ˆ ˆ X X Z Z Z ′ =                                                                                                                                         (27) 
 
From (27) it is easy to derive the following results.   
0 ˆ > Z when  0 ˆ < Z and  0 ˆ < Z when  0 ˆ > K . This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: A reduction in the permissible level of pollution in the presence of an informal sector leads 
to an increase in pollution while an inflow of foreign capital lowers the level of pollution in the economy. 
 
To explain these results in economic terms, let us first examine the effects of these policies on the effective 
pollution emission tax rate, say, F , where 
= F
3
2 ) ) ( (
X
Z X Z T −
 




  3 ˆX F F =  K ˆ − (.)} (.) { 2 T X Z T − ′ ′ [ 1 ) / 1 ( L λ θ ∆ )}] ( { 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − +  
                                                                                                       (+) 
                  Z T Z (.) { ˆ ′ − θ ∆ /( )}[{ ) ( 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − + } ) (.) ( { 2 3 2 1 X Z h L L K ′ ′ − + λ λ λ  
                                                                           (+)  
                                                                                                   )}] ( 3 2 1 K K L λ λ λ + −                      (28)   
                                                                                                  (−) 
                                                                         
We have already mentioned that the comparative static exercises are meaningful only if equilibrium in the 
market for the non-traded intermediary is stable. In the present case we have found that in the stable 
equilibrium 0 > ∆ and (.)}. (.) { 2 T X Z T < ′ ′  From (28) it then follows that F ˆ 0 >  when K ˆ 0 > ; and, 
F ˆ 0 <  when Z ˆ 0 < .  
 
If in an attempt to check further deterioration in environmental quality, the pollution control authority fixes 
the permissible level of pollution at a lower level, Z  takes a lower value. From equation (28) it follows 
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that the average pollution emission tax that the formal sector has to bear decreases. As a consequence, the 
effective price of the formal sector’s product (net of average emission tax) rises leading to an expansion of 
the formal sector. As the formal sector uses the output of the informal sector at a fixed rate, the latter sector 
also expands, thereby raising the pollution level of the society. On the other hand, owing to an inflow of 
foreign capital the aggregate capital stock of the economy swells up. It produces a Rybczynski effect leading 
to an expansion of the formal sector (also informal manufacturing sector) and a contraction of the 
agricultural sector as the manufacturing sector as a whole (formal plus informal) is more capital-intensive 
than the agricultural sector. The average pollution emission tax,F , rises and the effective price of the 
formal sector’s product decreases as  0 > ∆ (see equation (28)). This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect 
and exerts downward pressures on the output levels of the two manufacturing sectors. So two opposite 
effects on  3 X  (and hence on  2 X ) are generated. As the negative effect of an increase in F  outweighs the 
positive Rybczynski effect,  3 X (and hence  2 X ) falls in the new equilibrium.  
 
 
3.2   Policy effects on welfare 
 
To analyze the welfare implications of the two policies totally differentiating equation (12) and using (15), 
(16), (22) and (23) the following expression can be derived.
20
  
23 2 2 )}[ /( ) (.) .{( ˆ ˆ θ θ A X P Z T Z Y Y ∆ ′ = )} ( (.)) / (.) ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +  
                                                                                                                                       (−) 
                                                                                                                            C B 23 θ − )] ( 2 2X P ∆ − θ         
                                                                                                                                        (+)                                                           
           (.)} (.) ){ / )[( / .( ˆ
2 2 2 23 1 T X Z T X P A K L − ′ ′ ∆ + θ θ λ  
                                                                                           )}] ( { 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K B θ θ θ θ θ − + −              (29) 
                                                                                                                  (+) 
 
where  = A ], ) 1 ( (.) )} 1 /( (.) ) * [{( 1 3 1 23 3 1 3 3 L D L K L K L rK Wh h W W θ λ θ θ σ θ θ λ + − − − −  
] } (.) (.) { (.) ) * [( 3 3 2 3 X mP X Z W h T h W W B L − ′ ′ + ′ + − = λ ; and, 
= C 3 3 1 23 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 ))( 1 /( ( ) ( [ K L K L L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ σ θ θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ − + + +  
                                                                                                              . 0 )] 3 3 1 > + L K L θ λ λ  
                                                 
20 See Appendix IV for detailed derivation.  
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Using the stability condition from (29) we find thatY ˆ 0 < when  0 ˆ > K and  0 ˆ > Y when  0 ˆ < Z if (i) 
0 > A ; and, (ii)  . 0 ≥ B This establishes the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: A reduction in the permissible level of pollution in the presence of an informal sector leads 
to an improvement in welfare if (i)  0 > A ; and, (ii)  . 0 ≥ B On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital 
with full repatriation of income on foreign capital is welfare deteriorating under the same set of sufficient 
conditions. 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. With the lowering of the permissible pollution level, 
Z , the discrepancy between the actual and permissible pollution level increases. However, from equation 
(28) it follows that the average pollution emission tax that the formal sector has to bear decreases. The 
effective price of the formal sector’s product (net of average emission tax) rises leading to an expansion of 
the higher wage-paying formal sector. This we call the labour reallocation effect, which works favourably 
on welfare. The polluting sector (sector 2) also expands as its output is solely used in the formal sector in a 
fixed proportion. The labour endowment in efficiency units decreases as the level of pollution rises. 
Besides, a reduction in Z lowers 2 P , which in turn raises r  and  reduces W  following  a  Stolper-
Samuelson effect. Thus, the aggregate wage income is affected due to three different effects: (i) direct 
negative effect on W  following a reduction in Z , (ii) the labour reallocation effect as the higher (lower) 
wage-paying formal (agricultural) sector expands (contracts); and, (iii) changes in labour endowment of the 
economy in efficiency units. The net outcome on the aggregate wage income is ambiguous. There are other 
effects on welfare as well. Both the aggregate capital income and transfer payments to the workers (the 
pollution emission tax revenue collected from the formal sector) increase unambiguously. On the contrary, 
the cost of tariff protection rises as the formal sector expands. This lowers welfare. The net impact of all 
these effects would be an increase in welfare under the sufficient conditions: (i)  0 > A ; and, (ii)  . 0 ≥ B  
 
On the other hand, if foreign capital enters into the economy with full repatriation of foreign capital income 
the aggregate capital stock of the economy swells up. We have seen (see proposition 1) that it leads a 
contraction of the formal (and informal) sector. As the higher (lower) wage-paying formal (agricultural) 
sector contracts (expands), aggregate wage income falls due to the labour reallocation effect. However, 
there are two other effects on the aggregate wage income of the workers. As the polluting (informal 
manufacturing) sector contracts the labour endowment in efficiency units rises. Besides, an inflow of 
foreign capital lowers the price of the informal sector’s price, 2 P , which lowers W and raises r. There are 
again three different effects on the aggregate wage income. However, the aggregate capital income on 
domestic capital falls. Also, the transfer payments that the workers receive from the government also falls 
as the level of pollution (and hence the emission tax revenue) falls. On the contrary, the cost of tariff  
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protection falls as the tariff-protected formal sector contracts, which works favourably on welfare. The net 
effect of all these effects on welfare is negative if: (i)  0 > A ; and, (ii)  . 0 ≥ B However, it is easy to check 
that welfare may fall due to an inflow of foreign capital even in the absence of any tariff protection.
21
 




4.   Concluding remarks 
 
In developing countries reduction of the permissible level of pollution by pollution regulating authorities is 
a conventional policy to arrest further environmental degradation. Although both the formal and informal 
manufacturing units cause industrial pollution, the extent of pollution generated by the informal sector 
firms is significantly greater than that generated by their formal sector counterparts. As the informal sector 
firms have limited access to Environmentally Sound Technology (EST) and as they use backward 
technology these firm are responsible for a major share of pollutants. The formal sector firms in developing 
countries actually subcontract the informal sector firms to undertake a number of tasks and processes that 
are “dirty” from the environment point of view. Perrings, Bhargava and Gupta (1995) have argued that 
such subcontracting is an economical way for formal sector firms to avoid investment in ESTs made 
obligatory by the regulatory authority. The informal sector firms being unregistered units are difficult to 
control and so they face fewer incentives to prevent pollution. In the circumstances, an indirect way to 
control environmental pollution is to impose pollution emission tax on the formal sector firms if the level of 
industrial pollution created exceeds a certain permissible level. This is expected to induce them to minimize 
harmful discharges by cutting down the use of intermediaries produced by the informal sector and thus 
improve the environmental quality. A pertinent question is whether this indirect way of controlling 
pollution can actually deliver the goods. In this paper, we have analyzed the efficacy of such a policy in a 
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  This is a highly interesting result because it is contrary to the conventional Brecher-Alejandro 
proposition. Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have analyzed the welfare effects of foreign capital inflow in a 
two-commodity, two-factor full employment model. The important result is as follows: inflow of foreign 
capital with full repatriation of its earnings is necessarily immiserizing if the import-competing sector is 
capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff. However, welfare remains unaffected in the absence of any 
tariff. Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income. In the literature, the Brecher-
Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined in terms of three-sector full-employment models like 
Beladi and Marjit (1992a, 1992b) with the third sector being a duty-free zone. As the developing countries 
are plagued by labour market distortion, some attempts have been made to analyze the welfare impact of 
foreign capital inflow using a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework. For example, Khan (1982) has considered 
a mobile capital Harris-Todaro model with urban unemployment. A third sector, called an urban informal 
sector, has been introduced in the works of Grinols (1991) and Chandra and Khan (1993). The 
immiserizing result of foreign capital has been found to be valid in general (Grinols 1991 is, of course, a 
notable exception) in the presence of a tariff protected import-competing sector. Interestingly, in the 




three-sector general equilibrium model with a polluting informal sector, which produces a non-traded 
intermediary for the formal sector. Higher the use of informal sector product, higher is the pollution created 
and higher the discrepancy between permissible and actual level of pollution, so that the pollution emission 
tax payable by the formal sector is also higher. Again, labour endowment is measured in efficiency units 
where the efficiency of a representative worker is inversely related to the level of pollution.  The emission 
tax revenue is transferred to the workers in a lump-sum fashion. In this situation, we have shown that even 
if the permissible pollution level is reduced, the polluting sector may expand and lead to a deterioration in 
the environmental standard. Quite unexpectedly, this policy may improve welfare of the economy. This has 
a very important policy implication due to the counterintuitive results of direct environmental policies. On 
the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital may be effective in lowering the level of pollution although it may 
affect welfare of the economy adversely. Therefore, the paper finds that there might exist a trade-off 
between the economy’s objectives of lowering the level of pollution and improving national welfare. These 
results are new in the literature on trade and environment, which would help the policy makers in the 
developing countries in designing appropriate policies because reduction of pollution level and 
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Appendix I: Derivations of certain expressions 
 
 
Total differentiation of (3) gives 
 
2 23 3 dP a dr aK +   ] (.) )} (.)( { )[ ) /( ( 2 2 2
2
2 23 dX T Z d dX Z T X X a − − ′ ′ − =  
or,  2 3 23 2 3 2 23 2 23 3 ˆ (.) )) 1 ( / ( ˆ (.) )) 1 ( / ( ˆ ˆ X Z T t P a X T t P X a P r K ′ ′ + − + = +θ θ                             
                                                                                                    + )) 1 ( / ( 3 2 23 t P X a + Z Z T ˆ (.) ′           
or,  2 2 2 23 2 23 2 1 3 ˆ (.) ) / ( ˆ ) / ˆ ( X T X P P P L K θ θ θ θ θ = +   2 2 23 ˆ (.) ) / ( X Z T P ′ ′ − θ   
                                                                                                         + Z Z T X P ˆ (.) ) / ( 2 2 23 ′ θ                                                                
or,  2 2 2 2 23 2 1 23 1 3 2 ˆ (.)) (.) )( / ( )] ( )[ / ˆ ( X T X Z T X P P L L L K − ′ ′ + − + θ θ θ θ θ θ θ      
                                                                                      = Z Z T X P ˆ (.) )( / ( 2 2 23 ′ θ )                               (19) 
Again differentiation of (9) yields, 
) / ˆ ( ) / ˆ ( ˆ (.)) / (.) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 θ σ θ λ θ σ θ λ λ λ λ P P X h X Z h X X K L K L L L L − − = ′ ′ − + +  
                                                                                                          ) / ˆ )}( 1 /( { 2 23 3 1 3 3 θ θ σ θ θ λ P L K L − −                                         
Rearranging terms we get 
)] 1 /( ( )[ / ˆ ( 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ θ − + + L K L K L K L P   
                                                        0 ˆ ˆ (.))] / (.) ( [ 1 1 2 2 3 2 = + ′ ′ − + + X X h X Z h L L L λ λ λ          (20)               
 
Finnaly, differentiation of (6) gives, 
) / ˆ ( ) / ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 θ σ θ λ θ σ θ λ λ λ λ P P K X X L K L K K K K + + = + +    
                                                                                                   ) / ˆ ))( 1 /( ( 2 23 3 1 3 3 θ θ σ θ θ λ P L L K − +              
or,  1 1 2 3 2 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 ˆ ˆ ) ( )}] 1 /( { )[ / ˆ ( X X P K K K L L K L K L K λ λ λ θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ θ + + + − − − −  







Appendix II: Derivation of stability condition in the market for the non-traded intermediary 
 
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through adjustments in its price, 2 P . 
The stability condition in the market for commodity 2 requires that 
0 ) / ) ( ( 2 2 2 < − dP X X d
D . This implies around equilibrium, initially,  2 2 X X
D = . Thus, 
. 0 )) ˆ / ˆ ( ) ˆ / ˆ (( 2 2 2 2 < − P X P X
D                                                                                                             (A.1) 
 
We note that  2 1, X X and  3 X can be simultaneously solved from equations (3), (6) and (9) as functions 
of 2 P . Differentiating equations (3), (9) and (6) and keeping the parameters unchanged, we get the 
following three expressions, respectively. 
2 1 3 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ P M X H X G = + −                                                                                                                        (A.2) 
2 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ (.))} / (.) ( { ˆ P M X X h X Z h X L L L − = + ′ ′ − + λ λ λ ; and,                                                (A.3) 
2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ P M X X X K K K = + + λ λ λ                                                                                                   (A.4) 
 




3 2 > = > ′ ′ = X P T H X P X Z T G  
) / 1 )}( ( { } / ) {( 2 1 23 1 3 23 1 3 1 θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ L L L K L K M − + = + =  
); / 1 ))}( 1 /( ( { 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 θ θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ − + + = L K L K L K L M        and,                             (A.5) 
) / 1 ))}( 1 /( ( { 23 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 θ θ σ θ θ λ σ θ λ σ θ λ − + + = L L K L K L K M  
 
Solving (A.2) − (A.4) by Cramer’s rule we get: 
)]; ( ) ( )[ / ˆ ( ˆ
2 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 M M H M P X K L K L K L λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + + − − = and,                                     (A.6) 
(.))}] / (.) ( { ) ( )[ / ˆ ( ˆ
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 3 h X Z h M M M M G P X L K K L K L ′ ′ − − + + = λ λ λ λ λ λ λ        (A.7)    
where:  (.))}] / (.) ( { ) ( [ 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 h X Z h H G L K K L K L K L ′ ′ − − + − = λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ                     (A.8) 
 
 From (A.6) we find that 
)] ( ) ( )[ / 1 ( ) ˆ / ˆ ( 2 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 M M H M P X K L K L K L λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + + − − =                                        (A.9) 
 
Now the demand for the non-traded intermediary is given by 
. 3 23 2 X a X




3 2 X X
D = Using (A.7) one can find 
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 2 { ) ( )[ / 1 ( ) ˆ / ˆ ( L K K L K L
D M M M M G P X λ λ λ λ λ λ λ − + + =  
                                                                                                              (.))}] / (.) ( 2 h X Z h ′ ′ −           (A.10)   
Using (A.1), (A.9) and (A.10) we find the following stability condition for equilibrium in the market for 
commodity 2. 
 
= − )) ˆ / ˆ ( ) ˆ / ˆ (( 2 2 2 2 P X P X
D ) / 1 ( λ ) ( ) ( [ 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 M M H M M G K L K L λ λ λ λ + − +  
                                    0 (.))}] / (.) ( ) ( { 2 3 2 1 3 2 1 1 < ′ ′ − + − + + h X Z h M L L K K K L λ λ λ λ λ λ       
Inserting the values of  2 1, , , M M H G and  3 M from (A.5) into the above expression and noting that 
) / ( ) / 1 ( 2 2 23 3
*
3 X P X P θ = we get 
)[ / 1 ( )) ˆ / ˆ ( ) ˆ / ˆ (( 2 2 2 2 λ θ = − P X P X
D )} ( { 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − + ) ( { 3 2 1 K K L λ λ λ +  
                                                                                   (+) 
                                                                                               (.))} / (.) ( ) ( 2 3 2 1 h X Z h L L K ′ ′ − + − λ λ λ  
                                                                                                          (+)                             
                     + } / (.)} (.) { { 2 2 2 23 X P T X Z T − ′ ′ θ ) ( { 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ + +  
                                                                   0 )}] ))( 1 /( ( 3 3 1 3 3 1 23 3 1 < + − + L K L K L K L θ λ λ θ λ λ θ σ θ  
                                                                                                  (+) 
                                              0 ) / ( ) / ( > ∆′ = ∆ = λ θ λ                                                                  (25) 
where:  ) ( ) ( )}{ ( )[{ / 1 ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 23 1 3 K K L L L K L L L K λ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ + − + − + = ∆  
                                                 (+)                                                         (−)     
            (.))} / (.) ( 2 1 h X Z h K ′ ′ − λ 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 23 ( (.)){ (.) )( / ( K L K L K T X Z T X P θ λ λ σ σ λ λ θ + − ′ ′ −  
                         )}] ))( 1 /( ( ) 3 3 1 3 3 1 23 3 1 2 2 1 L K L K L K L L K L θ λ λ θ λ λ θ σ θ θ λ λ + − + + ; and,               (24)   
                                                                      (+) 
 
) ( [{ 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − + = ∆′ } )}] ( (.)) / (.) ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +       
                          (+)                                                                                            (−)  
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Appendix III: Derivation of equation (28)  
 
The effective emission tax rate is given by             
= F
3
2 ) ) ( (
X
Z X Z T −
                                                                                                                       
Differentiating F and using (18), we get 
Z Z T X T X X Z T X F F ˆ (.) ˆ (.) ˆ (.) ˆ
2 2 2 3 ′ − − ′ ′ =  
             
                  =  − − ′ ′ (.)} (.) { ˆ
2 2 T X Z T X Z Z T ˆ (.) ′  
 
 
Now using (22) one gets 
 
3 ˆX F F =  (.)} (.) { 2 T X Z T − ′ ′ [ K L ˆ ) / 1 ( 1 λ θ ∆ − )} ( { 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K θ θ θ θ θ − +  
                                                                           −  ] )} /( ) (.) {( ˆ
2 2 23 C X P Z T Z θ θ ∆ ′  − Z Z T ˆ (.) ′  
where,  = C 3 3 1 23 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 ))( 1 /( ( ) ( [ K L K L L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ σ θ θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ − + + +  
                                                                                                           . 0 )] 3 3 1 > + L K L θ λ λ                                      
Use of (24) and simplification yield 
3 ˆX F F =  (.)} (.) [{ 2 T X Z T − ′ ′ − ) / ( 1 θ λ ∆ L K L L L K ˆ )}] ( { 2 1 23 1 3 θ θ θ θ θ − +  
                                                                                                (+) 
                         Z X P C T X Z T X P Z T ˆ }] / ) {( (.)} (.) )}[{ /( ) (.) {( 23 2 2 2 2 2 23 θ θ θ θ ∆ + − ′ ′ ∆ ′ −    
 
Further simplification gives 
3 ˆX F F = (.)} (.) { 2 T X Z T − ′ ′ ) / [( 1 θ λ ∆ L K L L L K ˆ )}] ( { 2 1 23 1 3 θ θ θ θ θ − +  
               )}[ /( ) (.) {( θ ∆ ′ − Z T (.)) / (.) ( )}{ ( { 2 3 2 1 2 1 23 1 3 h X Z h L L K L L L K ′ ′ − + − + λ λ λ θ θ θ θ θ  
                                                                                                            Z K K L
ˆ )}] ( 3 2 1 λ λ λ + −            (28) 
 
Appendix IV:  Derivation of equation (29) 
 
Differentiation of equation (12) yields 
 
dr K dW X a da X W W dX a W W dX Z h W dW h dY D L L L + − − + − + ′ ′ + = 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 ) * ( ) * ( (.) (.)      
                                                                                                    Z d T dX Z T (.) (.) 2 − ′ ′ + 3 3dX mP −                                          
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or, 3 3 3 2 2 ˆ ) * ( ˆ (.) ˆ (.) ˆ X X a W W X X Z h W W Wh Y Y L − + ′ ′ + =  
                                                                r rK r X a W W D K L ˆ ˆ )) 1 /( ( ) * ( 23 3 3 3 3 + − − + θ σ θ                                                              
                                                                     W X WaL ˆ
3 3 − Z Z T X X Z T ˆ (.) ˆ (.) 2 2 ′ − ′ ′ + 2 3 3 ˆ X X mP −    
                               (note that  r a K L ˆ )) 1 /( ( ˆ 23 3 3 3 θ σ θ − = ;  ). 1 ( ) ( 23 3 3 θ θ θ − = + K L ).  
 
Now substitution of 2 ˆ X in place of 3 ˆ X into the above equation yields 
r rK X a W W W W h Y Y D K L L ˆ } )) 1 /( ( ) * {( ˆ )} 1 ( (.) { ˆ
23 3 3 3 3 3 + − − + − = θ σ θ λ  
                        2 (.)} (.) [{ X Z T h W ′ ′ + ′ + Z Z T X X mP h W W L
ˆ (.) ˆ ] (.) ) * ( 2 3 3 3 ′ − − − + λ  
                                                                                    
With the help of (15) and (16) the above expression becomes 
) / ˆ ].( )) 1 /( ( (.) ) * ( ) 1 ( (.) [ ˆ
2 1 23 1 3 3 3 3 1 θ θ θ θ σ θ λ λ θ P rK h W W Wh Y Y L D L K L L K + − − + − − =  
                                     Z Z T ˆ (.) ′ − 2 3 3 3 2 ˆ ] (.) ) * ( (.)} (.) [{ X X mP h W W X Z h W T L − − + ′ ′ + ′ + λ  
 
Using (22) and (23) we can write 
Y Y ˆ )} /( ) (.) [{ ˆ
2 2 23 X P Z T A Z ∆ ′ = θ θ )}] ( (.)) / (.) ( ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +  
          + Z Z T T X Z T X P A K L
ˆ (.) (.)} (.) }{ / [{ ˆ
2 2 2 23 1 ′ − − ′ ′ ∆ θ θ λ  
           )}] ( ){ / [( ˆ
2 1 23 1 3 1 L L L K L B K θ θ θ θ θ θ λ − + ∆ − ] )} /( ) (.) [{( ˆ
2 2 23 C X P Z T B Z θ θ ∆ ′ −  
 
where  = A ], ) 1 ( (.) )} 1 /( (.) ) * [{( 1 3 1 23 3 1 3 3 L D L K L K L rK Wh h W W θ λ θ θ σ θ θ λ + − − − −  
] } (.) (.) { (.) ) * [( 3 3 2 3 X mP X Z W h T h W W B L − ′ ′ + ′ + − = λ ; and, 
= C 3 3 1 23 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 ))( 1 /( ( ) ( [ K L K L L K L K L K L K θ λ λ θ σ θ θ λ λ θ λ λ σ σ λ λ − + + +  
                                                                                                              . 0 )] 3 3 1 > + L K L θ λ λ  
 








23 2 2 )}[ /( ) (.) {( ˆ ˆ θ θ A X P Z T Z Y Y ∆ ′ = )} ( (.)) / (.) ( ( { 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 K K L L L K h X Z h λ λ λ λ λ λ + − ′ ′ − +  
                                                                                                                                     (−) 
                                                                                                                          C B 23 θ − )] ( 2 2X P ∆ − θ    
                                                                                                                                      (+)                                                         
       (.)} (.) ){ / )[( / ( ˆ
2 2 2 23 1 T X Z T X P A K L − ′ ′ ∆ + θ θ λ )}] ( { 2 1 23 1 3 L L L K B θ θ θ θ θ − + −         (29) 
                                                                                                                        (+) 